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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD 'YARREN,

Respondent,
Case No.
7848

vs.
DIXON RANCH COMPANY,:>~

Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent desires, for purposes of clarity and
convenience, to restate the facts upon which this case
arises and to expand them somewhat to give a clearer
picture of the problems involved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The property in question was sold to Duchesne
County for taxes assessed against the Dixon Ranch
Company (Abstract, Ex. A), and the respondent,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff below, and his predecessors purchased the
same from Duchesne County, and have paid the taxes
thereon for the past 15 years ( R. 50, Ex. A) .
This action by the respondent to quiet title was
commenced in April of 1951, by the filing of a complaint (R. 2, 3). Summons was served upon the Valley Investment Company and an answer filed by that
company on June 19, 1951. Thereafter, on July 11,
1951, the Valley Investment Company filed a disclaimer (R. 9).
l
A summons and complaint were served upon
Dixon Ranch Company and upon Arnold Dixon
( R. 7) . Arnold Dixon was the sole surviving director
of the Pixon Ranch Company, which vvas a defunct
corporation (R. 7, 59). Service upon the Dixon Ranch
Company and upon Arnold Dixon was complete on
May 26, 1951 ( R. 7), and the default of these parties
was entered July 11, 1951.
Service by publication was had as to J. G. Brown
who was not a resident of Utah and whose whereabouts was unknown (R. 12, 16, 24). Publication of
Summons was complete August 23, 1951. Time for
answer by Brown under the published Summons expired September 12, 1951, and default of J. G. Brown
was entered September 13, 1951.
An answer, purporting to be that of the Dixon
Ranch Company, was filed September 13,, 1951, 90
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days after ans,ver \Vas due, and 64 days after the
default of that Con1pany had been entered. Upon
motion of respondent this purported answer and
counterclaim \Yere stricken as having been untimely
filed and having not been properly served upon
plaintiff or his counsel CR. 29,32). Thereupon the
court entered judgment for the respondent on October 16th, 1951.
Thereafter, on November 13, 1951 there was
filed by counsel for Dixon Ranch Company and
Arnold Dixon, a motion to Vacate Judgment CR. 39).
An affida"\'it accompanying said motion recites that
Arnold Dixon, upon v1hom service was made, was
and had for a long time been seriously ill and did
not notify interested parties (R. 40). A counter-affidavit was filed by the plantiff reciting among other
things that the default of the Dixon Ranch Company
was entered July 11, 1951 and that Dixon Ranch
Company had no answer properly filed in the case
CR. 50).
On January 7, 1952, the Motion of Dixon Ranch
Company and Arnold Dixon to Vacate Judgment,
was heard and counsel for defendants failed to appear. The court after consideration of the evidence
denied the motion, (R. 53) and entered an order to
that effect (R. 54).
Counsel for Dixon Ranch Company then filed
a motion for Reconsideration, reciting that the de-
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fendant Dixon Ranch Company had not received
notice of the hearing (R. 56). Upon a hearing on
February 18, 1952, the court granted the motion for
reconsideration and heard counsel on the motion to
Vacate. After arguments the court took the matter
under advisement and gave counsel an opportunity
to file a brief in support of the motion and give plaintiff an opportunity to file a brief in opposition (R. 62).
On March 20, 1952, the court filed a Memorandum Decision denying defendants' motion (R. 63,
64), and expanding at some length his his reasons
for denying the motion.

*

*

The

Notice of Appeal filed herein recites that
the appellants are Dixon Ranch Company, a corporation, Arnold Dixon and Paul Dixon, on behalf of
the stockholders of the Dixon Ranch Company
(R. 70). The undertaking on appeal recites the defendants Arnold Dixon and Dixon Ranch Company
have appealed (R. 73). The statement of Points on
Appeal recites that the defendants "Arnold Dixon,
Dixon Ranch Company and Paul, Dixon, stockholder
of the Dixon Ranch Company', set out their statement of points on appeal (R. 79). All of which leaves
some doubt as to exactly who is pursuing the appeal.
In their Statement of Points Relied Upon, the
appellants,
whoever they may be, recite the followSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing as points relied upon ( R. 79) :
*

*

*

2. That the record shows pursuasive evidence of due diligence on the part of the defendants so as to bring them within the meaning of 60 (b) U.R.C.P.

*

*

*

+. That the court has no discretion in
deciding the questionr of whether the stockholders should be allowed to defend the action
but is compelled to allow them to defend.
5. That title to the assets of a dissolved
corporation is vested in the stockholders.
6. That service of process upon Arnold
Dixon, sole surviving director of the Dixon
Ranch Company, was not due process so as to
preclude the stockholders from defending the
action.
7. Since title to property of a corporation
is vested in the stockholders, they are entitled
to personal service of process before they can
be deprived of their property.
However, in their brief the appellants indicate
that they vvaive all of the points set out above. (Appellants Brief page 2.)
It appears, therefore, that this appeal must necessarily be treated as an appeal by the Dixon Ranch
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Company, rather than as stated by Appellants Brief,
to include stockholde~s appealing on behalf of themselves and the rest of the stockholders (Appellants
Brief p. 1), and the appellant may not merely "concede" that there was service upon Arnold Dixon individually and as the sole surviving director of the
Dixon Ranch Company (Appellants Brief p. 7), but
rather, has admitted this to be proper service upon
the corporation.
.b

STATEMENT Of POINTS
1. The Court in the exercise of sound
discretion properly denied defendants motion
to Vacate the default entered.
A. The defendants failed to establish
excusable neglect to require setting aside the default.
B. The defendants failed to establish
a meritorious defense which would
require the Court to vacate the de·
fault.
2. The Court correctly ruled that it
would not be proper to grant the motion to vacate merely for the purpose of permitting a
cross action between certain of the defendants.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

The Court in the exercise of sound discretion properly
denied defendants motion to Vacate the defau,t.

In order for the Appellant to prevail, it is necessary that it establish first that there was excusable
neglect on its part which would be sufficient to justify
the court in setting aside its default, and second it
must establish that it had a meritorous defense to
the suit itself. Failing in either of these matters constitutes a failure to establish error on the part of the
trial court in its ruling. Since the matter admittedly
is one of discretion with the trial court, the appellant
has the laboring oar to establish that the trial court
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The respondent does not disagree with the principle espoused in Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 254, 90
P. 897, that the decision as to whether or not the judgment should be vacated is one to be passed upon by
the court in its sound discretion, nor the rule announced in Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908,
that "the discretion lodged in the court by this statute
to set aside a default is to be exercised in the furtherance of justice. In doubtful cases the courts vvill incline toward granting relief from defaults to the end
that a party may have a hearing."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

However, it is equally true that in a case \vhere

8

the court has carefully considered the evidence and
has given due weight to all the factors involved, and
in the exercise of sound judicial discretion has denied
a motion to set aside the default, his ruling should
be upheld. As stated in 3 Bancroft, Code Practice,
2479, Sec. 1876:
"Nevertheless, notwithstanding the remedial character of the statutes and their purpose to afford a speedy and efficient means of
relief, they are not to be invoked so as to impair the attribute of certainty and finality
which should attend all judgments, and a
judgment should never be annulled except
upon due consideration based upon a clear
showing."
This principle is clearly announced in the case
of Carmichael v. Carmichael, 101 Or. 172, 199 P. 385,
wherein the court said:
"vVhile section 103, Or. L., is remedial in
its character, and is intended to furnish a simple, speedy, and efficient means of relief in
cases where persons are, in the true sense of
the statute, victims of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, yet its wholesome provisions are not to be invoked, so as to
render judgments but temporary structures,
'to be torn down, remodeled, or rebuilt whenever the builders feel competent to improve
the original workmanship or design.' A judgment is sometimes termed a 'finality' because
it finally terminate the disputes and adjusts
the
adverse
interests
litigants,
itandshould
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never be annulled, except upon due consideration, based upon a clear showing."
That the trial court carefully considered and
weighed the merits of defendants motion to Vacate
is revealed throughout his lVIemorandum Decis~on
CR. 64). As the court puts it:
"The la'v is clear to the effect that the
trial court has a vvide discretion in an application to set aside defaults. However, it is not
permitted to rule arbitrarily or captiously.
There must be a legal foundation for its action
'Whichever way its decision may lie .... "
A. The defendants failed tot~ establish excusable
neglect to require setting aside the default.

The trial court in his Memorandum Decision
examines the evidence before him upon which defendants predicated their claim of excusable neglect,
and sets it forth therein. An examination of that evidence will at once reveal its insubstantial character.
The primary thing upon which defendants had
to rely, and upon which appellant now has to rely,
is the statement in the affidavit of Paul Dixon to the
effect that "Arnold Dixon is and for a long time has
been ill." As the court so aptly points out, there is no
indication whatsoever, of the nature of that illness,
and that no inference can be made that he was, or is,
mentally afflicted; and that a telephone call or a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A similar affidavit was made in the case of Scott
v. Wright, 50 Neb. 84·0, 70 N.W. 396, which did not
allege the nature of the defendant's sicknesswhether it was of such a character as to affect his
mind and deprive him of power to give directions
concerning a pending lawsuit. On appeal, an order
vacating the defaut, was reversed. In Reither v.
Webb, 73 Iowa 559, 35 N.W. 631 it was held that a
lame back was not sufficient to constitute excusable
negligence.
In Quist v. Gwinup, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 105, the plaintiff purchased property at tax sale and began proceedings thereafter based thereon and recovered a
judgment by default. Thereafter the judgment was
vacated upon motion of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
As a part of the petitioners papers was an affidavit by herself stating that she was not in very good
health and didn't understand the papers served upon
her. There "vas also an affidavit of a physician to the
effect that:
'' ... he had known Eliza Gwinup and that
she had been suffering from a goiter and had
been undergoing a change of life for several
years. She has suffered severe mental shock
due to tragedies in her life and all these things
had impaired her physically and had caused
a mental shock at least temporarily, and for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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processes so·that in his judgment this· mental
condition would not allo·w her to comprehend
and appreciate the nature of legal papers that
might be served upon her."
An opposing affidavit was filed to the effect that
she had been notified by letter two years earlier that
plaintiff had bid on the property and that something
must be done.
The court concluded from this evidence, which
is much stronger than that in the instant case, that
there was an insufficient sl1ovving to open the default.
In Cooper v. D~on; 58 Col. App. 2d 789, 131 P.
2d 733, it was held t~at the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to vacate a_ default judgment where the defendarit's-aff:idavit was to the effect
that she was ill and at times had to stay in bed~ For
other cases t<? likeeffect~ee: Romev. Warskafsy, 299
Ill. App. 609, 19 N.E. 2d 759;Thomas y. Arnold, 192
Ark. 1127, 96 S.Vv. 2d 1108; Ewes v. Davison-Paxon
; Co., 4~ Ga.- App.- ?22, ~-61 S.E. 275_~. ~
As positive evidence in the record that Mr. Arnold Dixon was in full possession of his mental faculties and>\vas able to conta-Ct an attorney and conduct
business affairs just shortly before he vvas served with
process in the pre~i~nt action is ·the fact that he executed a deed
Valley Invest:qtent Company, which
contained a. comprehensive _recital of factual matters
r.Sponsored bywith
relation
to ·the
-Dixon
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which was executed apparently in Provo, Utah, and
acknowledged before Maurice Harding, Notary Public, residing at Provo, Utnh. (See file on Motion to
Reconsider and Motion to Set Aside Default.)
Further evidence of his capacity and ability both
physically and mentally is to be found in the cornprehensive affidavit which he filed in support of the
Motion to Vacate and Motion to Re(:onside:r CR. 59).
Surely, if his affidavit \Vas entitled to be filed as representing a basis for vacating the judgment, it also
stands as an admission of the existence of mental
facility and physical ability to contact counsel had
he been so inclined. The plain fact is that he did
nothing, but quite obviously could have done something had he thought either he or the Dixon Ranch
Company had any interest in the property.
Certainly no excusable neglect can be made out
from the bare statement that Mr. Arnold Dixon is
and has been for a long time seriously ill, in view
of the fact that he was able to appear a few months
previously for the purpose of executing a deed, and
a few months afterward to make a comprehensive
affidavit. As a matter of fact, the affidavit of Paul
Dixon which recites the facts of the long illness does
not purport to say that because of the long illness
Arnold Dixon could not or did not notify interested
parties, but only that Arnold Dixon "is and for a
long time has been seriously ill and he did not notify
interested
parties."
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
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The more logically inferable reason why he
did not notify interested parties is that he considered
that neither he nor the Ranch Company had any interest in the property.
The only other basis shown by the affidavits to
even remotely hint at excusable neglect is the affidavit of Phil Hansen, one-time attorney for Dixon
Ranch Company. It should be noted initially, that
the Dixon Ranch Company had been in default for
87 days .before the September 9, 1951 date which
affiant sets as the time when counsel agreed to allow
hirn time in which to plead.
The court carefully considered and weighed this
affidavit as he, of course, was entitled to do in determing whether excusable neglect had been made
out, and concluded that it was not pursuasive to hi~
that excusable neglect had been made out. In this
he vvas fully justified. Excusable neglect to justify
voiding a default cannot be predicated upon something which is alleged to have occurred 86 days after
the default has occurred and 60 days after that default
has been entered. It can have no force or effect in
establishing excusable neglect. Nor has appellant
claimed more for it than evide:r1ce to sustain its theory
that it had been guilty only ~f excusable neglect from
which it should be relieved:
In Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Neilson :Land &
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in McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 104 P. 731,
it has been held such a promise as alleged in the affi.
davit of Phil I-Iansen, even if accepted as true, would
not be sufficient to justify a claim of excusable
neglect.
In Elms v. Elms, 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 164 P. 2d
936, the principles governing cases such as this are
fully expounded. In that case it is said:
"It is the duty of every party desiring to
resist an action or to participate in a judicial
pn>ceeding to take timely and adequate steps
to retain counsel or to act in his own person
to avoid an undesirable judgn1ent. Unless in
arranging for his defense he shows that he
has exercised such reasonable diligence as a
man of ordinary prudence usually bestows
upon important business his motion for relief
. . . will be denied. Courts neither act as guardians for incompetent parties nor for those
who are grossly careless of their own affairs.
All must be governed by the rules in force universally applied according to the shovving
made ... The la"v frowns upon setting aside
default judgments resulting from inexcusable
neglect of the co:r11plainant. The only occasion
for the application ... is where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation to his injury
without fault or negligence of his o"vn and
against which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded. Neither inadvertence nor neglect "vill warrant judicial relief unless it may
reasonably be classified as of the excusable
variety upon a sufficient shovv-ing."
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In Peterson v. Crosier 29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860,
it was held that the fact the defendant would have
lost his job had he attended the trial was not a sufficient showing of excusable neglect to constitute a
ground for vacating judgment.
B. The defendants failed to establish a meritorious
defense which would requ!re the court to vacate the
default.

The case of Queagly v. Willardson, 35 Utah 414,
100 P. 930, cited by the appellant, holds that the
court in passing upon whether a meritorious defense
is asserted, may not determine the truth or falsity
of the averments but only the question of whether
the defense asserted is meritorious. As the court so
aptly points out in the present case in his Memorandum Decision, the defendant admits by the answer
which was stricken, that the taxes had been paid,
since it offers to pay or settle them. This leaves only
a bare assertion by the affiant Paul Dixon, that the
plaintiff and his predecessors have not been in possession openly, notoriously and adversely for the
requisite period of time. The record reveals that the
appellant corporation passed whatever title it had to
the Valley Investment Company in 1950 .. Thus, it
appears that no;ne of the parties asserting rights as
appellants would be in a position to claim that theirs
was a meritorious defense to the existing action.
Where the defense is as tenuous as that upon which
the
hasFunding
to rely,
surely
the
court
could
justiSponsored
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S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
provided by
the Institute
of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

fiably conclude that the defense which had to be
based on so many contingencies was not sufficiently
meritorious as to warrant setting aside the default.
The court was thus not determining the truth
or falsity of any of the evidence, but only considering the assertions in the answer and the affidavits
in relation to the uncontradicted facts, to determine
whether a meritorious defense was asserted.

*

*

*

Thus, it appears conclusively, that appellant is
unable to sustain either of the two requirements it
must sustain in order to secure a reversal. First, no
showing of excusable neglect has been made out. To
the contrary, the neglect appears completely inexcusable as a legal proposition. Second, appellant
failed to assert a meritorious defense which would
justify the court in reversing the trial court.
The trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion and with a clear understanding of the principles upon which that discretion must be based, and
after carefully studying and weighing the evidence
of excusable neglect, and after careful study of the
claimed meritorious defense, upon correct principles
concluded that no showing of excusable neglect had
been made out and no meritorious defense shown.
Appellant to prevail must make out a case that
the
trial
judge, who clearly had the appropriate prinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ciples in mind to guide him, acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and a bused his discretion-not on one,
but on both of these propositions. This it has failed
to do. The court, to the contrary has done exactly
what the case of Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 254, 90
P. 897, has indicated that he might do, that is, to
apply his discretion to the facts as they appear in
each individual case. It is respectfully submitted, that
this court on appeal should affirm the ruling of the
trial court, there being no manifest abuse· of discretion shown.

*

*

*

An examination of the cases relied upon by the
appellant's brief reveals at once the clear distinction
between those cases and the instant case. An analysis
of the Cutler v. Haycock case reveals ample cause for
setting aside the default where the defendant's ·attorney had actually filed a demurrer which was en
route, and where transportation difficulties beset the
parties and vvhere the demurrer was filed within a
matter of one or two days, and the entire condition
was attributable to the lack of facilities for communication between the defendant and his counsel.
Again, in-Burd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908,
cited by appellant, the court had actually opened the
default within his discretion, but thenimposed a conSponsored dition
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
the Institute of Museum the
and Library
Services
¥/hich
;Was.
not.
met,· provided
and.bywhereupon
court
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

enforced the default. The court held that imposition
of such a condition was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court. Thus, factually, the case bears no relationship to the instant case. In that case the defendant
had filed a motion to make more definite and to
furnish a bill of particulars and thus was actively
engaged in the progress of the case when the default
was entered for failure to file an answer. This case
clearly is no panillel to the instant case.
POINT fl
The Court correctly ruled that if would not be
proper to grant the motion to vacate merely for the purpose of permitting a cross action between certain of the
defendants.

The only information we have in the record
with regard to the filing of a cross action by the appellant is that the Memorandum Decision recites that
in oral argument counsel for defendant stated that
he proposed to attack the deed from Arnold Dixon
to Valley Investment Company. Accordingly, with
nothing more than this to sustain the burden of appellant's argument on the second point in his brief,
it is extremely doubtful that any point is raised by
the brief for review.
However, the court did not base his denial of
the motion .to vacate upon the proposition that the
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re-opening of the case \Yould be only for the purpose
of a cross-action between the appellants and the Valley Investment Company (Appellant's Brief p. 12).
To the contrary, the court very clearly stated
in his Memorandum Decision, that he concluded that
it would be improper to grant the motion merely for
the purpose of permitting a collateral cross action
between defendants CR. 68). In other words, the fact
that one defendant desired to file a cross action
against another defendant w.~s not alone a sufficient
ground for setting aside the default.
vVhether the rules of Civil Procedure would or
would not allovv such an action within the framework of this suit is not material. The plain fact is
that no such ground, as here considered, exists under
Rule 60 (b) which would justify setting aside the
default for such a purpose. Therefore, the court was
entirely correct in his observation that such:a ground
is not a proper ground upon which to grant a motion
to set aside the default.

* * *
It is respectfully submitted tha,t this is a judgment which should be accor,ded the finality cyvhich it
deserves and freedom from upset by
belated attempt to oust the plaintiff from property upon which
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that the trial court was well within his discretionary
authority in ruling as he did, and that the judgment
should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

COLTON & HAMMOND
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD
Attorneys for Respondent.
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